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Abstract—Smart contracts are immutable, verifiable, and autonomous pieces of code that can be deployed and ran on blockchain
networks like Ethereum. Due to the immutability nature of blockchain, no change is possible on a deployed smart contract or a verified
transaction. On the other hand, there are millions of dollars carried by smart contracts in Ethereum blockchain, and hence, a faulty
smart contract can lead to a huge monetary loss. Therefore, it is important for smart contract developers to fully test and check the
correctness of their code before deploying it on the blockchain. In this paper, we propose a testing mechanism for smart contracts in
Solidity language, based on mutation testing. We analyzed a comprehensive list of known bugs in Solidity smart contracts, and
designed 10 classes of mutation operators inspired by the real faults. Our experimental results show that our proposed mutation
operators can regenerate 10 of 15 famous faulty smart contracts, which have resulted in millions of dollars loss. The results show the
effectiveness of our proposed mutation operators in detecting real faults in Solidity smart contracts. We have also extended Universal
Mutator tool with our mutation operators, so that it can automatically generate mutants for smart contracts written in Solidity.
Index Terms—Blockchain, Smart Contracts, Security Testing, Mutation Testing, Solidity Language
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1 INTRODUCTION
Blockchain is an immutable distributed ledger, where
users can trigger transactions by creating a wallet [1]. In
blockchain, there is no central database, and the full history
of transactions is stored by all network nodes. Adding new
transactions is only devoted to miners, who try to produce
new blocks out of received transactions to earn rewards.
In late 2013, Buterin et al. published the Ethereum white
paper [2], where they introduced Ethereum as a global,
open-source platform for decentralized applications (known
as smart contracts) based on blockchain. Smart contracts
are immutable pieces of code, stored and executed au-
tonomously by the Ethereum miners. They can hold Ether
or new defined assets (ERC20 tokens), and include rules for
sending (or dispensing) these assets. Several smart contracts
have been published on the Ethereum network for different
applications, including security tokens, voting, gambling
and lottery, property ownership, stocktaking, etc. Millions
of dollars are carried by smart contracts, and hence, any se-
curity vulnerability in these smart contracts can lead to huge
monetary losses. As an example, we can mention the famous
DAO attack [3], which resulted in loss of 150 million dollars.
Due to the immutable nature of smart contracts, their cor-
rectness is significant. There are more than 34000 vulnerable
smart contracts on the Ethereum blockchain, carrying about
4905 Ether [4], which shows the need for effective analysis
techniques for them. Therefore, guaranteeing the correctness
of smart contracts have recently attracted researchers in
software engineering and distributed computing.
There have been several attempts to analyze the cor-
rectness of smart contracts. Most of these works focus on
static analysis of smart contracts based on the known bug
patterns [5], [6]. Static analysis is a strong tool for evaluating
software quality, however, it has its own limitations. First
of all this technique can only find the bugs which are
matched with the known patterns, and any other bug cannot
be detected. Moreover, since the code is not executed in
this technique, there may be many false positives in the
reported bugs. In other words, some reported bugs may
correspond to the paths of the code which are not possible
to execute. Therefore, static analysis techniques need to
be strengthened with dynamic analysis methods including
testing. One of the main challenges in testing is test design.
More specifically, from the large set of possible scenarios, the
question is how to select a sufficiently small subset of test
cases that are more likely to find the potential bugs. Several
techniques have been introduced in the test community for
designing effective test cases. It is crucial to have a test
design technique, considering the specific features of smart
contracts, and the bugs resulting from the distributed nature
of their running environment. Our idea is to use mutation
testing approach for smart contract testing. Mutation testing
is known as the strongest technique for test design. There
are several mutation operators designed for different pro-
gramming languages. In this paper, our goal is to propose
a set of mutation operators specifically designed for the
Solidity programming language, considering the known
real bugs made by smart contract developers. There is one
paper with similar idea [7], where 15 mutation operators
are proposed based on Solidity documentation. Note that the
power of mutation testing is very much dependent on its
mutation operators, and we believe the operators that can
mimic the real bugs can select more effective test cases. We
did an extensive study to identify the known bugs in the
scope of smart contracts usingmany academic papers, open-
source smart contracts (and their open or closed issues)
on Github [8], articles in the websites like Medium [9],
and Q&A websites like Stack-Exchange [10]. We used this
list of real world known bugs to design a set of mutation
2operators. We also proposed a set of mutation operators for
Solidity specific features, including constructor, modifiers,
methods for transaction call, and also self-destruct.
Our contributions in this work are as follows:
• We propose a set of mutation operators for Solidity
inspired by the real faults in smart contracts written
in this language.
• We evaluated the effectiveness of our mutation oper-
ators by applying them to the fixed version of famous
buggy smart contracts, and finding the percentage of
real bugs generated by our operators.
• We extended the Universal Mutator [11] tool by our
mutation rules to generate mutants for smart con-
tracts automatically.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we
briefly discuss the preliminary concepts including smart
contracts and mutation testing. In Section 3, we present our
mutation operators with details about the intuition behind
them. In Section 4, we discuss our techniques for evaluating
the effectiveness of our mutation operators. We briefly men-
tion the related works in Section 5, and concluding remarks
are presented in Section 6.
2 PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we briefly discuss the preliminary concepts
used in this work, including the notion of smart contract, as
well as mutation testing concepts.
2.1 Smart Contracts
As we discussed earlier, Ethereum provides a Turing-
complete programming language named Solidity for devel-
oping smart contracts. Each smart contract is an Ethereum
account that holds a piece of code (i.e. the source code for
the smart contract), has some private storage, and also can
hold some money in Ethers (the Ethereum currency). Thus,
there are two types of accounts in Ethereum:
• External accounts, which are owned by Ethereum
users and are like simple bank accounts, and
• Smart contract accounts
Both users and smart contracts can initiate transactions
for transferring currency or running a smart contract, which
will change the state of the transaction-based Ethereum
Virtual Machine (EVM). The execution of smart contracts
and verifying the validity of transactions are devoted to a
set of special network nodes, called miners, which get fee
from the transactions’ initiators for doing the computations.
In the Ethereum network, smart contracts can be written
it different languages such as JavaScript, C++, and Solidity.
To deploy a smart contract on Ethereum, it should be
compiled to EVM byte-code and stored on the Ethereum
network. Then, the EVM allocates a limited storage for the
compiled contract and assigns an address to both compiled
smart contract and the allocated storage. Any Ethereum user
can later use the assigned address to trigger any function
from the compiled contract. To submit a transaction, either
for transferring money or triggering a function from a smart
contract, a user should pay some fee in Ether, known as gas.
Paying the gas prevents the Ethereum network from being
attacked by wasteful tasks (or getting stuck in an infinite
loop), and also is an incentive for the miners to run the
smart contract or verify the transaction. In the Ethereum
network, the gas amount is related to the complexity of the
code, meaning that an Ethereum user needs to pay more gas
to run complex smart contracts. In a case that a user do not
pay sufficient gas value, the EVM raises an exception and
all changes caused by the transaction will revert.
2.2 Mutation Testing
Mutation Testing is one of the strongest techniques for test
design. The idea behind mutation testing is changing the
source code of a program with tiny syntactic changes, called
mutation operators. The mutation operators are language
specific changes that are designed considering the features
of the language, or the common faults made by software
developers. For example, a mutation operator may change
the +mathematical operator to −, or remove negation from
a logical condition. To test a program, we should apply all
mutation operators to the source code of the program (one
after another), which results in a set of modified programs,
called mutants. To select a set of test cases from a pool of
randomly generated scenarios, they are run on the program
and the mutants. If the output of running the test case on
the program is different from the output of running it on a
mutant, the mutant is said to be killed, and that test case is
selected. Mutation score for a set of test cases corresponds to
the percentage of mutants killed by these scenarios, and is a
metric for evaluating the effectiveness of test cases.
The philosophy of mutation testing is based on two
hypotheses: the competent programmer hypothesis (CPH)
[12],[13], and the coupling effect hypothesis [13]. CPH states
that the competition among the developers makes them
develop a code that is really close to the final correct
program. This indicates that although there may be faults
in a program, but most of them are minor, and can be
fixed by minor changes in the program. Therefore, mutation
operators are designed to add tiny changes in the program.
The Coupling Effect states that a test case identifying the dif-
ference between a small changing mutant and the original
programs, can identify more complicated faults as well.
3 MUTATION TESTING OF SMART CONTRACTS
In this research, our goal is to propose a systematic approach
for selecting effective test cases for smart contracts based
on mutation. The strength of this method is very much
dependent to its mutation operators. Mutation operators
are usually inspired by the common faults in a language
or domain. In other words, they usually mimic the common
bugs of the programs written in a language. Different mu-
tation operators may be applicable for many programming
languages, while some of them may be language-specific,
and depending on the specific features of that language.
There are different languages for writing smart contracts
in Ethereum, among which, in this paper we just focus on
the Solidity programming language. Solidity is very similar
to JavaScript, but it includes more functions to support writ-
ing smart contracts. To design effective mutation operators
3Operators Description
ABS ABSolute value insertion
AOR Arithmetic Operator Replacement
CRP Constants RePlacement
CRR Constants for Reference Replacement
LCR Logical Connector Replacement
ROR Relational Operator Replacement
RCR Reference for Constant Replacement
FDL Formula DeLetion
FRC Formula Replacement with Constant
RFR Reference Replacement
UOI Unary Operator Insertion
SCL Swap Code Lines
TABLE 1
Classic mutation operators
for Solidity smart contracts, we first conducted an extensive
study on the known real world bugs in the scope of smart
contracts. Our sources of investigation are academic papers,
open-source smart contracts repositories including open or
closed issues on Github, articles in the websites like Medium
and Q&A websites like Stack-Exchange [10]. We ended up
with a collection of most repeated bugs that may happen in
the implementation of a smart contract in Solidity program-
ming language. Studying the bugs in smart contracts, we
categorize them to two groups:
1) Classic Bugs: These bugs occur in almost any pro-
gramming language, from which we can mention
arithmetic issues or logical bugs (inside conditions).
2) Solidity Bugs: These faults are mostly related to
the Solidity programming languages, and the dis-
tributed nature of blockchain and smart contracts.
Hence, we conclude that classical mutation operators
designed for general-purpose programming languages, e.g.
JavaScript, are not sufficient for the Ethereum platform, and
we need to design other mutation operators to mimic the
Solidity specific bugs. So, we divide our mutation operators
into two groups: (i) Classic Mutation Operators, and (ii)
Solidity Mutation Operators.
3.1 Classic Mutation Operators (CMO)
Classic mutation operators include a set of mutation oper-
ators, which can be used for almost any programming lan-
guages (with maybe some minor differences due to the dif-
ference in syntax). Among these operators, we can mention
arithmetic and logical operators. They are designed to target
a group of bugs that are common in most programming
languages. Effective classic mutation operators have been
designed for different languages, which also can be used
for Solidity smart contracts [14]. These operators mostly
contain insertion, deletion, and replacement of arithmetic
and logical operators, some of which are depicted in Table 1.
3.2 Solidity Mutation Operators (SMO)
Considering our list of known real-world bugs, we have
designed 9 classes of Solidity-specific mutation operators
to mimic the common security and software bugs in smart
contracts. In this section, we discuss different classes of
Solidity-specific bugs and our designed mutation operators
for them.
3.2.1 Overflow-Underflow
Overflow and underflow bugs are common in many pro-
gramming languages, but in Solidity smart contracts, an
underflow or overflow breach can cause huge monetary
losses. Overflow happenswhen a number exceeds the upper
bound of its type. For example, assume a uint32 variable
that has the maximum value of 232 − 1. If this variable
increases in an operation beyond its maximum value, it
will return to its minimum value of 0. More specifically,
consider this scenario of a smart contract, where it is needed
to increase someone’s balance, but because of overflow, the
balance value will be set to 0. A developer should recheck
each statement using some guard functions, to avoid over-
flow or underflow related bugs. In Listing 1, you can see an
example for a smart contract containing an overflow bug,
and a method to secure it.
mapping (address => uint32) public balanceOf;
// INSECURE
function transfer(address to, uint32 value) {
//Check if sender has balance
require(balanceOf[msg.sender] >= value);
//Add and subtract new balances
balanceOf[msg.sender] -= value;
balanceOf[to] += value;
}
// SECURE
function transfer(address to, uint32 value) {
//Check if sender has balance and for overflows */
require(
balanceOf[msg.sender] >= value
&&
balanceOf[to] + value >= balanceOf[to]
);
//Add and subtract new balances
balanceOf[msg.sender] -= value;
balanceOf[to] += value;
}
Listing 1. Overflow bug
Similar bug happens with underflow, when one tries to
decrease a uint32 variable, for example, below its minimum
value (i.e. 0), and instead of getting a negative value, the
variable gets its maximum value (232 − 1). For example,
consider someone tries to withdraw all of her balance from
a contract, but instead of setting her balance to 0, she ends
up with the maximum value of the variable type, because
of a simple underflow. Listing 2 shows an example source
code containing an underflow bug:
mapping (address => uint32) public balanceOf;
// INSECURE
function transfer(address to, uint32 value) {
//Check if sender has balance
require(balanceOf[msg.sender] >= value);
//Add and subtract new balances
balanceOf[msg.sender] -= value;
balanceOf[_to] += value;
}
// SECURE
function transfer(address to, uint32 value) {
//Check if sender has balance and for overflows
require(
balanceOf[msg.sender] >= value
&&
balanceOf[to] - value <= balanceOf[to]
4Operators Description
USP Unsigned to Signed Replacement
PSU Signed to Unsigned Replacement
IST Increase Size of a Type
DST Decrease Size of a Type
TABLE 2
Mutation operators for Overflow-Underflow
Access Control Definition
Public All can access
External Cannot be accessed internally, only externally
Internal Only this contract and contracts deriving
from it can access
Private Can be accessed only from this contract
TABLE 3
Access control levels in Solidity
);
//Add and subtract new balances
balanceOf[msg.sender] -= value;
balanceOf[to] += value;
}
Listing 2. Underflow bug
In Listings 1 and 2, assuming that balances are real assets
like Ether, simple overflow or underflow can cost millions
of dollars. To detect these bugs, we propose Overflow-
Underflow mutation operators, which are depicted in Ta-
ble 2. In IST and DST operators, the size of a type is in-
creased/decreased respectively. For example, the type int32
is replaced by int8, or int64.
3.2.2 Access Control
It is a must for every developer to understand how she can
restrict parts of her code from other parts. In smart contracts,
the access controls is very important and the corresponding
bugs can be very dangerous and potentially leads to big
loss of assets. In Solidity, there are four levels of access
control, namely Public, External, Private, and Internal [15].
The difference between these types can be seen in Table 3.
Listing 3 shows an example for access control bug in
a smart contract. This contract has a public function called
helpCharity that everyone can call to transfer some assets to
the contract address from her balance. Also, there is another
function named transfer, which should be called from
helpCharity to transfer asset to the charity’s address. As
this function is mistakenly defined as public, an attacker can
call transfer function and transfer all assets to her address,
instead of the charity’s address.
mapping (address => uint256) public balanceOf;
//Public function so everyone can help the charity
function helpCharity(uint256 value) public {
let charityAddress = 0
xe0f5206bbd039e7b0592d8918820024e2a7437b9;
transfer(to: charityAddress, value: 1);
balanceOf[msg.sender] -= value;
}
// transfer mistakenly defined as a public instead
of private
function transfer(address to, uint256 value) public
{
balanceOf[to] += value;
}
Listing 3. Access control bug
Operators Description
PuPrR Public to Private Replacement
PuIR Public to Internal Replacement
PuER Public to External Replacement
PrPuR Private to Public Replacement
PrIR Private to Internal Replacement
PrER Private to External Replacement
IPuR Internal to Public Replacement
IPrR Internal to Private Replacement
IER Internal to External Replacement
EPuR External to Public Replacement
EPrR External to Private Replacement
EIR External to Internal Replacement
TABLE 4
Mutation operators for access control
To detect the access control bugs, we have designed a set of
mutation operators, which are listed in Table 4.
3.2.3 Transaction Call Mechanism
In Ethereum, we can use transactions to send an asset from
one account to another account or trigger another contract’s
code. There are three methods for creating a transaction
in Solidity smart contracts. These methods are different in
terms of gas usage and their return value, and hence, each
one should be used in appropriate situations. These three
methods are as follows:
1) send: It only includes 21000wei (the smallest denom-
ination of Ether) into the transaction. That means the
execution process of the called function must not
exceed 21000 wei, otherwise the transaction will be
incomplete, and the send returns false.
2) transfer: transfer also includes only 21000 wei
into the transaction. However, if the execution of
a function exceeds 21000 wei of gas, it will throw an
exception, rather than returning false.
3) call: Using this method can be dangerous, as it
transfers all the remaining gas for the transaction
to the called function.
An example of a bug caused by inappropriate usage of
transaction call is reentrancy. This attack occurs when a func-
tion from the first smart contract makes an external call to
another one using call function. Listing 4 shows an exam-
ple of this bug, where an attacker can deploy a contract and
define its fallback function to rerun the withdraw function.
After deploying the contract, she can call Victim’s withdraw
function, and msg.sender.call.value(amount)() is going
to send some assets to Attacker’s contract, which results in
calling the fallback function of the Attacker that will call
the withdraw function again, and so on. Since Victim uses
call as a mechanism to send asset, call is going to send all
the remaining gas to the attacker’s contract and the attacker
can take control of the transaction flow and recursively
call withdraw function, till all the gas burns. Therefore, in
this scenario an attacker can steal all the contract’s assets
before the Victim contract sets her balance to zero. But, if
Victim uses send function instead of call, it would only use
21000 wei, and Attacker’s fallback function would throw
“OutofGas” exception because of lack of gas.
//Victim function
function withdraw() external {
5Operators Description
TCR Transfer to Call Replacement
TSR Transfer to Send Replacement
SCR Send to Call Replacement
STR Send to Transfer Replacement
CSR Call to Send Replacement
CTR Call to Transfer Replacement
TABLE 5
Mutation operators for transaction call mechanism
uint256 amount = balances[msg.sender];
require(msg.sender.call.value(amount)());
balances[msg.sender] = 0;
}
//Attacker fallback function
function() external payable {
Victim v;
v.withdraw();
}
Listing 4. Reentrancy Attack
We have designed 6 mutation operators to take care of
transaction call mechanism bugs that can be seen in Table 5.
3.2.4 Guard Mechanism
In Solidity, it is possible to use guards as a way of handling
errors. Guards are some state-reverting exceptions which
will undo all changes in the EVM if a condition (a Boolean
expression) is not met.
There are three guard functions available in Solidity pro-
gramming language, which are assert, require, and revert
. Each one has its own behavior, and a developer should
be careful about using the appropriate one. Careless usage
can result in freezing the contract, or making it vulnerable
to attacks. When we use assert as a guard function, this
operator will use all the associated gas, but require and
revert will send back the remaining gas. As an example,
in Listing 5, if the developer forgets to use require in the
justOwner function, anyone can call justOwner which will
lead to abnormal and unexpected behavior.
address owner;
function justOwner() {
require(msg.sender == owner)
//if someone rather than owner call this function
something bad will happen.
}
Listing 5. Guard mechanism bug
Table 6 shows our mutation operators for the guard mecha-
nism.
3.2.5 Transaction Origin
There are a number of fields in the msg object that provide
more information for the receiver of the message (transac-
tion). For example, msg.sender identifies who has triggered
the transaction, msg.value contains the value of attached
assets, and msg.data returns the attached date to the trans-
action, if any. Also, tx.origin can be used to find out
the original first user who has triggered the transaction. A
transaction can be the result of a chain of other transactions,
which have called each other, and in these cases, tx.origin
can identify who is the root of this call chain.
Operators Description
ARevR Assert to Revert Replacement
AReqR Assert to Require Replacement
RevReqR Revert to Require Replacement
RevAR Revert to Assert Replacement
ReqAR Require to Assert Replacement
ReqRevR Require to Revert Replacement
AReq Add Require
AA Add Assert
ARev Add Revert
DReq Delete Require
DRev Delete Revert
DA Delete Assert
TABLE 6
Mutation operators for guard mechanism
Inappropriate usage of tx.origin and msg.sender can
put a smart contract into the danger of an attack. As an
example, in Listing 6, there are two smart contracts, called
Victim and Attacker. In Victim, only the owner of the smart
contract can call the transfer function and send assets to
an address. The developer has mistakenly used tx.origin
to see whether the caller is the owner or not. If the owner
wants to transfer some assets to the Attacker contact, after
triggering the transaction, assets will be transferred to the
Attacker contract, resulting in running its fallback function.
The statements in the fallback function causes to transfer
any number of funds to the Attacker, because the very first
origin of the transaction is the Victim’s owner. To prevent
this, the developer should check msg.sender, instead of tx.
origin.
//VICTIM
contract Victim {
address owner;
constructor() public {
owner = msg.sender;
}
function transfer(address to, uint64 amount)
public {
require(tx.origin == owner);
to.call.value(amount)();
}
}
//ATTACKER
interface Victim {
function transfer(address to, uint amount);
}
contract Attacker {
address owner;
constructor() public {
owner = msg.sender;
}
function() payable public {
let randomValue = 64;
Victim(msg.sender).
transfer(owner, randomValue);
}
}
Listing 6. A transaction origin atack
Table 7 shows our mutation operators, designed for Trans-
action Origin attacks.
3.2.6 selfdestruct Operator
The selfdestruct function (previously known as suicide),
helps developers to destruct a smart contract. This function
takes an address as argument to transfer all the stored assets
6Operators Description
TMR Tx.origin to Msg.sender Replacement
MTR Msg.sender to Tx.origin Replacement
TABLE 7
Mutation operators for Transaction Origin
Operators Description
RSF Remove selfdestruct from a Function
SSL Swap selfdestruct’s location to adjacent lines
TABLE 8
Mutation operators for selfdestruct
in the smart contract to that, before destructing the smart
contract. For example, calling selfdestruct(addr) sends all
the contract’s current balance to the address addr.
This operator is useful, when we are done with a smart
contract, as it transfers assets to a given address with
consuming less gas amount than simple transfer using addr
.send(this.balance). In fact, because of freeing up some
space in the EVM, selfdestruct actually uses negative gas.
Thus, using this operator wisely can be helpful, however,
if a developer mistakenly uses this function, it will lead
to destroying the smart contract and it may cause loss
of stored assets. In order to deal with this bug, we have
designed two mutation operators to remove selfdestruct
from the code, and swap its location to adjacent lines
(Table 8).
3.2.7 Constant Properties
Each smart contract can use many constant values, includ-
ing smart contract or user addresses, number of tokens
(e.g., the number of tokens to issue), gas amount on each
transaction call, etc. Setting wrong constant values can lead
to incorrect behavior of a smart contract. For example, using
wrong constant address can cause sending money to a
wrong user, or running wrong function from a malicious
contract. Settings wrong gas amounts may fail a transaction,
or wrong value of issued token can cause huge monetary
losses. Therefore, developers should set the constant val-
ues carefully in smart contracts before deploying them on
EVM. Table 9 depicts our mutation operator designed for
constants values used in a smart contract.
3.2.8 Function Modifiers
Function modifiers can be defined as Boolean conditions
added to a function declaration. When a function with mod-
ifier is called, first the modifiers are validated, and only if
all its modifiers are satisfied, the function begins to execute.
The function modifiers are widely used to check the author-
ity of Ethereum users for calling a smart contract’s function.
Operators Description
CAA Change Address to another Address
CDG Increase and Decrease in Gas amount
CCV Change in any Constant Value
TABLE 9
Mutation operators for manipulating constants
Operators Description
CMT Change Modifier to true
CMF Change Modifier to false
TABLE 10
Mutation operators for manipulating modifiers
Hence, wrong or buggy modifier can cause unauthorized
access to important functions of a smart contract. As an
example, in Listing 7, there is a function, called justOwner
with the onlyOwner modifier. This modifier restricts calling
this function to the contract owner. Using this modifier can
be very important, as the function may include transferring
the contract assets. You can see that a small bug in the
modifier, such as changing == to !=, can cause unauthorized
access of an attacker.
address owner;
modifier onlyOwner {
require(msg.sender == owner);
}
function justOwner() onlyOwner {
// transferring the contract assets
}
Listing 7. An example of using modifier
Table 10 shows our proposed mutation operators for ma-
nipulating modifiers. These mutation operators change each
modifier to the constant values of true or false. Selected
test cases by these operators can better check the correctness
of the implemented modifiers.
3.2.9 Constructor Name
In Solidity, a smart contract can be initialized by a con-
structor, where the required initialization statements of a
smart contract take place before deploying it to the EVM.
For example, initialization of the owner property of the
smart contract can be performed in its constructor. Correct
spelling of the constructor name is very important, as a
mistake in its spelling will cause Solidity not recognizing
the function as a constructor. On the other hand, if a function
is mistakenly named as the constructor’s name, it is going
to be behaved like a constructor, and can cause unexpected
behaviors. Listing 8 is an example, where misspelling of a
constructor function can cause damage to the contract. In
this example, a typo in the name of the constructor made it
a simple regular function named Exampl. Thus, any user can
call this method and introduce herself as the contract owner.
address owner;
contract Example {
// Correct Behaviour
function Example(address add) public {
owner = add
}
// Wrong Behaviour (typo on contract name)
function Exampl(address add) public {
owner = add
}
}
Listing 8. An example of a bug caused by constructor name
Table 11 shows our mutation operators for manipulating the
smart contract’s constructor name.
7Operators Description
CCN Change Constructor Name to something else
CFC Change a Function’s name to Constructor
TABLE 11
Mutation operators for manipulating constructor name
4 EVALUATION
Mutation testing is a well-known technique in software test-
ing, and different mutation operators have been proposed
for several languages. There are a few methods to evaluate
the effectiveness of the designed mutation operators [16],
[17]. One way is to analyze the real faults already detected
in software developed in the studied language, and find the
number of faulty codes that can be regenerated by applying
one of the mutation operators to the corresponding cor-
rected code. High percentage in this evaluation can indicate
the resemblance of the mutation operators to the real faults,
and can be an indication to the power of the mutants in
selecting effective test cases (the ones that can find the bugs
in the code).
To evaluate the effectiveness of our proposed mutation
operators using this technique, we first gathered a compre-
hensive set of real world known bugs from a number of
available lists including [18], [19], [20], [21], [22], [5]. Then,
we applied our mutation operators to the source code of
the fixed version of these smart contracts to see if we can
generate the previously detected bugs. Table 12 summarizes
our evaluation results for these real world case studies,
which shows that our mutation operators can regenerate
10 out of 15 real world bugs. Here, we list all the designed
mutation operators related to each real world bug, and the
operators that could regenerate the bug have been marked
with “*”.
In the following, we discuss more details on some of
these faults in the real world examples, especially the ones
that cannot be regenerated by our mutation operators. “Re-
Entrancy” and “Delegated Call” bugs have been the most
costly faults in the Ethereum history. Our mutation oper-
ators can successfully regenerate these classes of faults in
smart contracts. Arithmetic issues are also the other most
repeated faults in smart contracts. To detect these arithmetic
issues, we have proposed Solidity-specific mutation oper-
ators, in addition to the classical operators for arithmetic.
These operators help us to cover more real faults in the
arithmetic class of bugs in Solidity language.
Another class of known real world bugs are Timestamp-
dependence faults, which are very common in lottery ERC20
tokens (e.g. [18], [31]). This bug happens when a smart
contracts uses the block timestamp values as a random seed,
ignoring the fact that a malicious miner can manipulate
the timestamp value within 900 seconds to her benefits [5].
Similarly, some smart contracts use the blockhash functions
to compute the hash values of blocks. This function can
only compute the hash values for the last 256 Ethereum
blocks and in other cases, it will return zero. There are many
faulty lottery smart contracts that use blockhash function
to generate random numbers [33], [34]. To avoid these two
faults, we suggest developers to use 3rd party libraries,
which provide secure random generators [37], [38]. Since
the solutions (corrections) for the bugs related to generating
random numbers are complicated mechanisms, we could
not design any mutation operator that can regenerate this
bug from the corrected code.
To evaluate our mutation operators in practice, we have
also extended a well-know tool for generating mutants,
called Universal Mutator [11], and added our Solidity-related
mutation operators to it. The enhanced tool accepts a So-
lidity smart contract and generates all its possible mutants
based on our proposed operators. One of the great features
about this tool is detecting invalid (the ones that cannot be
compiled) and redundant mutants. The source code for this
tool is available online on Github [39], and can be used by
other researchers and smart contract developers. We used
this tool to generate the mutants for a number of well-
known smart contracts. The number of valid, invalid, and
redundant mutants generated for each smart contract can
be seen in Table 13.
5 RELATED WORK
In this section, we discuss the related works in two areas of
analyzing smart contracts and mutation testing.
5.1 Mutation Testing
Mutation Testing was first proposed by Lipton in [40]. The
technique can be used in different levels of testing, including
unit, integration, and specification. Mutation can be used to
identify effective test suite that developers can use to test
their application [41]. Mutation operators are often designed
to mimic the common faults in a programming language.
The technique has been widely used for test design in
different programming languages, including Fortan [12],
Ada [42], C [43], and Java [44]. It has even been used to
test non-functional properties of a software, such as energy
testing of Android applications [45].
5.2 Analysis of Smart Contracts
There are several works on analyzing smart contracts for
bugs and vulnerabilities. They can be categorized into three
groups; static analysis techniques, formal verification, and
testing. Luu et al. in [5] introduced OYENTE, which is a
tool to statically analyze smart contracts using symbolic
execution . Symbolic execution can be used to identify the
inputs needed to reach to specific parts of a code. Bhargavan
et al. in [46] introduced a framework to convert the byte-
code of a smart contract to F ∗, a functional programming
language, and then verify a set of specifications for it. The
limitation of this framework is due to the complexity of
verification, and as reported in the paper, only 49 smart
contracts out of a list of 396 contracts could be verified
by this framework. Kalra et al. in [6] introduced Zeus that
uses abstract interpretation and symbolic model checking to
formally check smart contracts. Zeus has less false positives
compared to similar frameworks. However, it does not
support some Solidity operators, like selfdestruct or throw
. Brent et al. in [47] introduced Vandal as a security analysis
tool for Ethereum smart contracts. Vandal uses logic-driven
program analysis to analyze smart contracts and detect
the security bugs and vulnerabilities. Finally, Jiang et al.
8Bug Class The Bug Related Operators Value Date Reproducable?
Re-Entrancy The DAO [23] SCL*, SCR 3M Ether (∼ $50M) June 2016 ✓
Delegated Call
Parity: “MultiSig” [24] IPuR*, IPrR, IER 153K Ether (> $30M) July 2017 ✓
Parity: “I Accidentally Killed It!” [25] RSF, ASF* 500K Ether (∼ $300M) Nov 2017 ✓
Arithmetic
PoWN Overflow [26] IST, DST, DReq* 886 Ether (∼ $800K) Feb 2018 ✓
BeautyChain Batch Overflow Bug [27] IST, DST, DA* 1058 BEC April 2018 ✓
ICON Disable All Transactions [28] LCR* Potentially $800M Jun 2016 ✓
Constructor
Name
Rubixi [29] CCN*, CFC Potentially 108 Ether April 2016 ✓
Morph Case Sensitive Constructor [30] CCN*, CFC ∼ 400 Ether June 2018 ✓
Timestamp-
dependence
The Run [31] ✗
GovernMental: “Timestamp” [18] ✗
Not Checked
Return Values
KoET Return Check [32] CSR*, SCR, DReq* 98.5 Ether Feb 2016 ✓
Etherpot Blockhash Bug [33] Sept 2016 ✗
SmartBillions Randomness [34] ∼ 400 Ether Oct 2017 ✗
Dynamic
Libraries
Re-Entrancy Honey Pot [35] CAA* 1 Ether Feb 2018 ✓
Denial of Service Governmental: “Too Much Gas” [36] 1100 Ether Apr 2016 ✗
TABLE 12
Evaluation Results
Smart Contract Valid Invalid Redundant Total
Smartex 60 57 25 142
ethBank 154 22 47 223
NEST LoanContract 129 169 89 387
BITNOMO 71 136 65 272
WOR 45 83 42 170
TABLE 13
Mutants generated by the extended universal mutator
developed ContractFuzzer which is a fuzzer to test smart
contracts for vulnerabilities and security drawbacks [48].
There is one recent work on testing smart contracts
using mutation testing approach [7]. In this work, Wu
et al. proposed 15 mutation operators based on Solidity
documentations. In comparison, we have surveyed a com-
prehensive list of reported real bugs in Ethereum smart
contracts, and designed our mutation operators based on
these bugs. We have also included a set of mutation oper-
ators for Solidity-specific features. Using this approach, we
have a more complete list of operators, from which we can
mention the operators for overflow-underflow, transaction
call mechanisms, selfdestruct, andmodifiers. We have also
suggested including more classical operators such as SCL,
ABS, etc to better detect possible bugs in Solidity smart con-
tracts. Considering the evaluation, we have evaluated our
mutation operators by checking their power in regenerating
the real faults. We have also extended the Universal Mutator
with our rules to automatically generate mutants for Solidity
smart contracts.
6 CONCLUSION
Smart contracts are immutable, verifiable, and autonomous
software, hosted and ran on blockchains, like Ethereum.
Due to their immutable nature, smart contracts cannot be
changed, once they are deployed on the blockchain. There-
fore, it is important for developers to fully analyze their
smart contracts before deployment. In this research, we ana-
lyzed a comprehensive list of known bugs in Solidity smart
contracts, and proposed 10 classes of mutation operators.
Our experiments show that our operators can regenerate
the real faults for 10 smart contracts out of 15 famous buggy
ones. We have also extended the universal mutator tool with
our mutation operators to automatically generate mutants
for smart contracts. We believe that our designed operators
can help Solidity developers (and testers) to better develop
bug-free and safe smart contracts.
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